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Abstract
This essay develops a framiezeork for thinking about
the miioral basis for the commnodijfication of hunan
reproductive nmaterials. It arguies that selling anid
buyinlg ga"letes and genes i's niorally acceptable
although there should niot be a niarket for zygotes,
emnbryos, or geniomles. Also a miiarket in gamletes and
genes shouild be regutlated in order- to address conicernis
about the adverse social consequences of
conmmodificationl.
(Journ-ial of Medical Ethics 1998;24:388-393)
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Introduction
The burgeoning reproductive assistance industry
has created an uneasy tension between individual
economic interests and human dignity. On the one
hand, people who donate sperm or eggs claim to
have a right to remuneration for goods and
services. If a person has a right to sell blood or
hair, then that person should have a right to sell
gametes. On the other hand, the commodification
of tissues which have the potential to become
adult human beings threatens human dignity and
other moral values. Matters become even more
complicated when we consider ownership of
human genomes, since genomes are not simply
pieces of tissue, but are blueprints for making and
regulating organisms.
This essay develops a framework for thinking
about the moral basis for a market in human
reproductive materials. It argues that the com-
modification of gametes and genes is morally
acceptable although there should not be a market
for zygotes, embryos, or genomes. This position
may be at odds with current property laws of
many countries, which forbid the buying and sell-
ing of bodies and body parts, but the paper is con-
cerned with moral, not legal issues. However, this
essay may have some bearing on the morality of
current or pending statutes, regulations, or court
decisions.
The moral basis for commodifying body
parts
Before turning to this paper's main topic, it will be
useful discuss the moral basis for the commodifi-
cation of body parts in general. Commodification
is a social practice for treating things as commodi-
ties, ie as properties that can be bought, sold, or
rented. Since commodities are alienable they
can be sold it is possible to regard something as
a form of property but not as a commodity. For
example, we might view voting rights as a type of
property but not as a type of commodity, since
voting rights may be acquired, lost, or owned, but
not sold.
Even ifwe treat a thing as a commodity, we may
impose restrictions on its commerce for moral,
social, economic, or political reasons. For exam-
ple, condominiums are commodities that are
bought, sold, and rented with various restrictions
pertaining to redecorating, pets, sub-leasing, pric-
ing, etc. Thus, one may distinguish between two
forms of commodification: complete commodifi-
cation (commodification with no restrictions) and
incomplete commodification (commodification
with restrictions).' This distinction allows us to
focus more clearly on this paper's main question:
should human reproductive materials be treated
as complete commodities, incomplete commodi-
ties, or not as commodities at all?
The moral basis for treating these body parts or
products as commodities stems from the body-as-
property view found in libertarian political
thought, which holds that the body and its parts
may be bought, sold, and rented. This philosophy
traces its conceptual ancestry to the seventeenth
century philosopher John Locke, who argued that
each individual's body belongs to that individual,
and that individuals can acquire other properties
by appropriating them from nature and mixing
their labour with those things.2 This position
implies that individuals also own their body parts
and products. Locke's views on property still play
an important role in contemporary debates, and
modern libertarians have refined his position.'
In the bioethics literature, several writers have
defended the body-as-property view.4 According
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to Andrews, the principle of autonomy provides a
basis for treating the body as property.4 Most of
our autonomous choices presuppose some control
over our own bodies. If we think of ownership of
an object as a collection of rights to control the use
of that object, then autonomous individuals own
their bodies, body parts, and body products. Many
of the most important standards in medical ethics
also reflect this viewpoint. For example, invasive
medical procedures require ethical justification.
The very notion of an invasion of the body draws
on the body-as-property image, since an invasion
is an intrusion into a territory. The doctrine of
informed consent also draws on the body-as-
property view. Informed consent holds that com-
petent individuals have a right to exclusive control
over their bodies, and exclusive control over an
object is a characteristic of ownership.
For the purposes of this essay, I will accept the
body-as-property view. I realise that this is a con-
troversial position, but I will not defend it fully
here. (I refer the reader to other authors for
further discussion.7) Instead of defending this
view, I will consider some arguments against com-
modification and use them to argue for incom-
plete commodification of the living body (I
include the word "living" here to indicate that this
discussion does not apply to cadavers, unless indi-
cated otherwise.)
Why might one regard the body as commodity
but resist its complete commodification? To
answer this question it will be useful to address
two important moral arguments against com-
modification. The first argument appeals to Kan-
tian concerns about human dignity and person-
hood; the second examines the social
consequences of ownership practices, attitudes,
and policies. I will discuss these arguments in dif-
ferent contexts throughout this essay.
Unconditional value
According to the Kantian argument, commodifi-
cation of the human body treats people as things
that can be bought and sold. If human beings can
be bought and sold, then they have a market value
and can be treated as mere objects by themselves
or other people. According to Kant, it is always
wrong to treat people as mere objects, since
human beings have inherent moral worth and
dignity.8 Although objects can be treated as com-
modities and can be assigned a market value,
human beings should not be treated as commodi-
ties and should not be assigned a market value.
Human beings have an unconditional or absolute
value. Thus, commodification of human beings is
inherently wrong because it violates human
dignity and worth.9
I accept this Kantian position. However, I think
it is possible to treat human bodies as commodi-
ties without violating human dignity and worth.
Although Kant uses the term "humanity" in
describing our moral obligations, it is clear from
reading his work that this term refers to the
rational nature in human beings, ie "persons" or
"rational agents". Kant recognised that the body
houses many elements, such as emotions, physical
desires, and so on, that are distinct from the
body's rational nature. Ifwe accept this separation
of person and body, then one might commodify
the body without treating a person as a commod-
ity. Thus, bodies that do not contain persons, such
as anencephalic newborns, bodies in a persistent
vegetative state (PVS), or cadavers, could be com-
modified without violating the dignity or worth of
persons.
Unrealistic portrait
However, this argument paints an unrealistic
portrait of the connection between persons and
bodies. The body is not like a coat that we can wear
or a tool that we can use. Although it is possible to
distinguish between the person and the body, these
two entities are intimately connected in human
beings.'" Selling a living human body is virtually the
same thing as selling a person, and having exclusive
control over someone else's body is tantamount to
slavery. Only those who maintain a rigid mind/body
dualism will not concede that there is an intimate
relationship between the mind and body.
Yet this close connection only holds between
the whole body and the person; it does not hold
between parts (or products) of the body and the
person. Although we think of persons as being
connected to whole bodies, we do not think of
persons as being tied to particular body parts or
products. One does not lose a part of one's self by
cutting one's hair, urinating, or donating blood.
Thus, it is important to distinguish between a
whole human body and its parts or products.
Doing something to a part of the body does not
imply doing something to the whole body, and
selling a part (or product) of the body need not
imply selling a whole body. Hence, one may com-
modify a part or product of the body without
commodifying the whole body. (Some people view
their personal identity as being closely connected
to certain parts, such as the brain or heart, but this
observation does not undermine my general
point.)
With this distinction in mind, one might hold
that parts of the body may be commodified even if
the whole body should not be. Since the whole
body is intimately connected to the person, it
should not be viewed as alienable property.4 5
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Hence, the whole body should not be treated as a
complete commodity. But we can treat parts ofthe
body as alienable even if the whole body should
not be treated this way. Thus, one may hold that
selling a whole body is immoral but regard
commerce in human tissue as morally acceptable.
However, there still may be some good reasons for
regulating the sale ofbody parts. For instance, one
might hold that it is immoral to sell body parts
that are essential to the body's proper functioning
because this form of commerce would imply mur-
der, suicide, or other forms of killing. People may
sell one kidney but not two kidneys, since human
bodies cannot function without two kidneys. (A
person might still give away his or her second kid-
ney, but I will not address that question here.)
Some organs, such as the heart and brain, may not
be sold, given our current medical limitations and
philosophical views about the connection between
the person and the brain.
The second argument against treating bodies as
commodities addresses slippery slope concerns:
although it is not inherently wrong to sell body
parts or products, the acceptance of this practice
will lead to adverse social consequences as we move
toward complete commodification of the body.'
According to Kass, if we allow body parts or prod-
ucts to be sold, then we will start to view the whole
body as an object or commodity. This attitude will
lead to the dehumanisation and objectification of
people.9 Our downward slide might start with the
selling ofbody parts, but it will lead to trade in chil-
dren, anencephalic babies, cadavers, and PVS
patients. Eventually we will sell adults into slavery.
To preserve our belief in the inherent worth of
human life and dignity, we must not view any part
of the body as having commercial value.
While I appreciate the force of this argument, I
think that we can avoid these adverse social
consequences by regulating the market in body
parts or products.4 We could forbid the sale of
things whose commercialisation would have an
adverse impact on our respect for human life and
dignity, such as human cadavers, PVS bodies,
anencephalic newborns, and so on. Informed
consent would also seem to be a wise restriction
on any commerce in body parts or products. By
requiring that sellers and buyers give informed
consent before a transaction takes place, we may
be able to avoid many pitfalls. One of the biggest
threats from a market in body parts comes when
other people are allowed to treat a person's body
as a commodity without that person's consent.4
Other writers object to commodification on the
grounds that it undermines the gift relationship
that currently exists between donors and recipi-
ents ofhuman organs. A market in body parts and
products will eventually destroy this relationship
by transforming it into an economic transaction."
I do not find this argument very convincing since
many commodities that are routinely bought and
sold are also given as gifts, such as clothing, land,
cars, and labour. People will always have reasons
and motives for giving gifts, even when those gifts
have commercial value. The mere fact that an
object can be bought or sold need not destroy our
ability to transfer that object as a gift.
Some writers have pointed out that commodify-
ing parts of the body might lead to a practice
where people are required to sell body parts or
products to pay outstanding debts or to meet the
demands of retributive justice. Thus the phrase
"it cost me an arm and a leg" would be too real to
invoke laughter. However, I think we can avoid
these disturbing consequences if we enact some
restrictions on the transference of body parts or
products. For instance, we could make it illegal to
take body parts or products to pay debts or
administer punishments.
Finally, one might argue that the selling of body
products could lead to the exploitation of the eco-
nomically worse-off members of our society. Peo-
ple might sell their kidneys out of economic
hardship.' ' But why would we think it is wrong to
sell body parts out of economic need? After all,
people take on many dangerous and degrading
occupations for economic reasons. If it is wrong to
sell kidneys out of economic need, then it is also
wrong to work in a coal mine or deliver pizzas in
dangerous neighbourhoods. The problem with
working under these conditions is not the
economic transaction itself; it is the fairness of the
transaction. We have laws that protect people from
exploitation and regulate working conditions.
Similar laws could also apply to a market in body
parts and products.
The preceding arguments against commodifi-
cation all suggest a common response: body parts
and products, but not the whole body, should be
regarded as incomplete commodities. In order to
answer Kantians' concerns about the objectifica-
tion of people, we should not permit a market in
whole, living, human bodies; in order to address
the slippery slope argument, we should regulate
the market in body parts and products. I will now
apply this analysis to the commodification of
human reproductive materials, paying special
attention to the two main arguments against com-
modification.
The commodification of reproductive
materials
Is it immoral to buy and sell sperm, eggs, zygotes,
embryos, or genomes? Before answering this
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question, it will be useful to distinguish between
the sale of reproductive services (which is usually
legal), and the sale of the reproductive materials
themselves (which is often illegal). In the debate
about surrogate mothering, some authors have
argued that contracts with gestational surrogates
are not baby-selling because these women are only
selling the use of their wombs.'2 Although I think
this is an interesting distinction, I do not think it
makes much sense for the issues that are the topic
of this paper, since we are not dealing with forms
of commodification that can be easily treated as
mere services. Carrying a child in a womb is
clearly a valuable service, but how is ejaculation a
service? A donor who does not provide sperm will
not be paid. The same point holds for other
reproductive materials. Thus, this essay will focus
only on the sale of reproductive materials.
Commodification of gametes
If it is morally acceptable to commodify body
parts of products, then gametes may be bought
and sold, since gametes are body products. If
individuals can buy and sell blood, hair, or tissue,
then they should also be allowed buy and sell
gametes.'3 However, the two arguments against
commodification pertain to the sale of gametes.
First, one might object to the commodification of
gametes on the grounds that gametes are unlike
other cells and tissues. Sperm and eggs contain
half a human genome and can unite to form a
zygote. A zygote can become a child if it implants
in a uterus and develops normally. Thus, selling
gametes is dangerously close to selling persons,
since gametes can become persons. Although I
agree that gametes (germ cells) are unlike other
body cells (somatic cells), I do not find this argu-
ment very persuasive. Selling gametes is not the
same thing as selling persons or zygotes, since
gametes are not even potential persons. A gamete
is more like half of a blueprint for making a house
(person) than a whole blueprint (zygote) or house
that is under construction (fetus or child).
Second, one might argue that the commodifica-
tion of gametes will have adverse effects on other
social values, such as our respect for human life
and dignity. The commodification of gametes
could create a market in children or adults, or it
could lead to the exploitation of poor women for
their eggs. For example, suppose that sperm are
sold in fertility clinics and are advertised in maga-
zines and newspapers. The market could set a
price for gametes and those people with the "best"
qualities could demand the highest prices for their
reproductive materials. I think this type of
development could threaten our notions ofhuman
dignity and worth; hence, we may need to regulate
the market in gametes. Since the selling of
gametes has not yet invaded our popular culture,
this situation bears watching. In any case, this
argument only shows that gametes should be
treated as incomplete commodities.
The commodification of zygotes and
embryos
One might also argue that zygotes and embryos
(henceforth just zygotes) can be commodified on
the grounds that they are simply body products. If
gametes can be bought and sold, then zygotes can
also be bought and sold. To make full sense of the
objections to this argument, we must say some-
thing about when a human organism becomes a
person, since the Kantian view forbids a market in
persons but not a market in bodies, as such. If we
follow the Kantian account of personhood, then a
human being does not become a person until he
or she can understand and follow moral impera-
tives. Thus, zygotes and other later stages of
development are not persons. Kantian concerns
about the objectification of persons therefore have
little bearing on the selling of zygotes.
However, zygotes are potential persons. Zy-
gotes, unlike gametes, have a complete set of
genetic instructions and normally also have their
own genetic identity. Although human develop-
ment depends on many different environmental
factors and gene-environment interactions, zy-
gotes are much more like adult human beings than
gametes. As potential persons, zygotes merit spe-
cial moral concern.'4 Potential persons merit spe-
cial moral concern because the way we treat these
beings can have a profound effect on the way we
treat actual persons. A society that allows babies to
be bought and sold is more likely to allow adults to
be bought and sold than one that does not. Like-
wise, a society that allows zygotes to be bought
and sold is more likely to accept a market for chil-
dren and adults than one that does not. Moreover,
this is not a problem that can be handled simply
through regulation, since a market in zygotes
would imply a profound change in our under-
standing of human beings and could lead to the
commodification and objectification of children
and adults. Since even a limited market for zygotes
can create this dangerous slippery slope, zygotes
should not be commodified. As an aside, this dis-
cussion has some bearing on disputes between
couples over the use of frozen embryos. In one
case, a woman wanted to implant a frozen embryo
that she had produced with her estranged
husband, but he refused to let her do this.1' Since
frozen embryos should not be treated as com-
modities, this man should not be able to sell his
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rights to the embryo. Embryos also should not be
traded for other items in divorce settlements.
Although my view does not imply that embryos
should not be treated as property, the slippery
slope argument I have considered in this essay
suggests that even allowing embryos to be treated
as property could have some adverse conse-
quences that we would want to avoid, such as
baby-selling and the objectification of people. To
avoid these consequences, the courts should treat
embryos like children, not like commodities or
other forms of property. The embryo's best inter-
ests, not market concerns or property rights,
should play the deciding role in settling these
cases.
The commodification of genomes
The last issue I would like to consider is the own-
ership of human genomes. To understand issues
pertaining to the commodification of genomes
and their parts (ie genes or gene fragments), it is
important to realise that there is a fundamental
difference between genomes, gametes, and zy-
gotes. Gametes and zygotes are physical entities
that can be produced, destroyed, corrupted,
stored, or harvested; genomes and genes, on the
other hand, are not mere physical entities.
Gametes and zygotes have spatial-temporal
boundaries; genomes and genes cannot be located
in any particular time or place. Genomes and
genes are essentially information for making and
regulating organisms." As information, they con-
stitute abstract objects that can be realised in bio-
chemical structures or represented by linguistic
symbols. They are more like software than
hardware. In legalistic terms, genomes (and
genes) are best viewed as intellectual property.'
Viewing the genome as intellectual property has
important implications for moral arguments for
and against its commodification. Western intellec-
tual property laws distinguish between items that
can belong to individuals and items that cannot be
owned. For example, people cannot own scientific
laws or concepts, though they may have copyrights
over works that express those laws or concepts.
People also cannot own natural phenomena, such
as benzene, but they may patent processes for
making benzene. The general thrust of these laws
is to distinguish between ideas (or abstract
objects) and tangible expressions or applications
of those ideas. Ideas are common resources and
cannot be owned by individuals, although particu-
lar expressions or applications of ideas can
become personal property."' Thus, these laws
assume that only tangible expressions of ideas can
be commodified.
There are two moral arguments for distinguish-
ing between ideas and their expressions or
applications. If we think of ideas as natural
resources, then Locke's views on property imply
that ideas can be treated as common resources.
People may own things that result from adding
labour to those ideas, for example, inventions or
original works, but they may not own the ideas
themselves. According to the utilitarian approach
to intellectual property, intellectual property laws
should promote social utility through encouraging
scientific and technological progress. The most
effective way to promote this kind of progress is to
encourage the sharing of ideas, data, and theories
while allowing scientists and inventors to profit
from and receive credit for their works. Thus,
there is a solid moral basis for laws that treat ideas
as common resources but allow the ownership of
particular expressions or applications of ideas."'
I believe that the preceding discussion of intel-
lectual property can provide us with some insights
into the commodification of human genomes. If
we treat genomes as intellectual property, then
genomes are natural phenomena. As such, they
are common resources that may not be owned,
although individuals may own particular expres-
sions or applications of genomes. If I invent a
technique for analysing, sequencing, or cloning a
genome (or one of its parts), then I may patent
that invention; if I create an original work describ-
ing a genome (or one of its parts), then I may have
copyrights that govern the reproduction of that
work. Hence, people may buy and sell inventions
and original works pertaining to the genome or
genes, but they may not buy or sell naturally
occurring genomes or genes.
Having said this much in favour ofsome form of
ownership of the genome, I would like to address
the two objections to commodification discussed
previously. We can imagine some objectionable
forms of ownership pertaining to the genome. For
example, biotechnology companies have patented
genetically engineered mice. What if a company
attempted to patent a genetically engineered
human being? Since patents govern the buying,
selling, and production of inventions, this form of
ownership would entail the ownership of persons,
since the patent would allow the company to con-
trol the production and marketing of whole
human bodies. Copyrights on the whole genome
could result in similar problems. A person who
copyrighted an entire genome would be able to
sell these copyrights to interested buyers. Al-
though this form of commerce would not
constitute commodification of a whole human
body, it could threaten our respect for human life
and human dignity: a society that allows copies of
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genomes to be bought and sold is more likely to
allow human beings to be bought and sold than
one that does not."7 Selling copyrights to an entire
genome is very much like selling a zygote, since
genomes can be used to make zygotes.
On the other hand, patents and copyrights on
parts of the genome would not entail the
commodification of whole human bodies and
probably would not threaten our respect for
human life and human dignity. Patents or
copyrights on individual genes would be no more
pernicious than patents or copyrights on artificial
body parts, such as artificial skin, blood, or heart
valves. Thus, copyrights and patents can be
extended to parts of the genome, but they should
not be applied to the whole genome. However,
there may be some good reasons to regulate the
market in gene patents and copyrights in order to
prevent slippery slope effects. For instance, we
might choose to restrict the marketing of human
genes used for the sole purpose of genetic
engineering; we might forbid people or companies
from acquiring a whole genome; we might take
steps to prevent companies from obtaining
monopolies on human genes, and so on. Hence,
the entire human genome should not be regarded
as a commodity, although parts of the genome
may be regarded as incomplete commodities.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have argued that gametes and genes
may be treated as incomplete commodities, while
whole genomes, zygotes, and embryos should not
be commodified at all. Markets in gametes and
genes should also be regulated in order to prevent
potential threats to human dignity and other
moral values. I should note that this paper has not
addressed other important questions pertaining to
the ownership of human reproductive materials.
Commodification simply represents a particular
form of control, but other types of control are
possible, such as stewardship, partnership, and so
on.20 21 A discussion of these other forms of own-
ership could provide some additional insights into
proprietary relationships in human reproduction,
but I will not engage these issues here.
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